“The idea of there not being anyone in this country is unbearable: I have to run for elections”

In 1985, the Socialist Party candidate to the next presidential elections unabatedly signed the Treaty for Portugal’s entry into the European Union. This was the first political act in Portugal that I accompanied with enthusiasm. It was a victory for Portugal and it definitely put us in the route to Europe and to development. In 1986, the candidate from the left on the next presidential elections was elected, for the first time, PR. These were the first elections in my memory, where I supported, in an active and emotional way, Mário Soares. In 1991, Mário Soares was overwhelming re-elected PR (even then, the phenomenon of the “void” already showed some signs). Possible future PR, probable future PR, Socialist Party candidate to the next presidential elections, candidate of the left to the next presidential elections, Mário Soares. I apologize for repeating myself, but I do not get tired of repeating it, since they tell me that it is true, I read it on the newspapers, but I still cannot believe it. As I write this article, Wednesday, the 31st August, early morning, I still have a small hope that he will back down at the last moment (but, deep down I know it is not going to happen). The candidacy of Mário Soares, a unique man in the Portuguese history of the second half of the 21st century, represents the complete failure in the renovation of the political system, a kind of generational politic scleroses (with its origins in Mário Soares’ generation but also, although to a smaller extent, in Cavaco’s one) that halted the renovation, settling in its own failure (of being able to put together parties and bring about capable politic leaders) the reason of its maintenance in power. “There is no one else, I have to advance”, must have thought Mário Soares when he decided to decide to be a candidate for candidate. It is this “no one” that worries me. Is it, as it seems, that there really is not anyone else in the Portuguese left (the right is not much better) capable of presenting himself as a strong candidate to PR in the beginning of the XXI century? And is it the case that, because there is no one else, exactly one of those responsible for this void is going to be elected, taking into account the long-term exercise of party power by Mário Soares. Honestly, the next presidential elections deserved the occurrence of surprises. To the left and to the right. Somebody that would challenge this “back-and-forth” of “addicts” to power and history. That would halt the paradox in the genesis of this process that may not be more than an intimate dialog of the kind: “the idea of the Socialist Party, my Socialist Party, giving its support to a comrade more dedicated to Arts than to electoral victories is unbearable; the idea of the Socialist Party, my Socialist Party, supporting Freitas do Amaral is even more unbearable; the idea of not being anyone in this country is unbearable: I have to run for elections ”

Money: Wanted

In the European Union (EU), with the terrorist tension in turmoil, the difficulties in economic growth and the sensitivity of the questions related to immigration and border control increasing, the concept of Independent State has gained terrain to the idea of Member State ( “Member-State”, and therefore, co-responsible for group decisions and for the success of their implementation). Only this explains all the tension about the EU’s budget, that is, about 1% of EU’s product (a national budget is usually situated between 45 and 50%of the national product). With the reinforcement of the importance of nationality and the difficulties in growth and in job creation, the “old buddies” have started counting each euro. Looking at the “old” 15 (not counting with Luxembourg), I will briefly refer to a basic difference that, among others, structures the relationship between States in the EU: there are those that pay and those that receive, that is, some Members States are net contributors for the EU’s budget, while others benefit from the referred budget.

When they seat at the negotiation table, the difference between those who contribute for the thin budget of the EU and those who benefit from it over and over again is clear. If I give the money to someone, I can demand some conditions. If I receive the money, I can, in as much, be a “good student” (I can also be a “bad student” here and there as long as such behaviour does not turn into a rule on the eyes of those who pay me, running the risk of having my nice sponsor simply stopping the payments). It is because of this (but not only) that only the more uninformed thought that Germany could be fined for having a deficit of about 4% of the product. It will be enough, through the German perspective, having offered its national currency to be ran together with those gentlemen and ladies of the south Europe that deserve little trust and to having been, since always, (and by far) the biggest net contributor (in absolute values) to the communitarian budget. “Enough! The Second World War ended 50 years ago and we (Germans) have enough problems with our economy and our development model.” On the other side of the barricade we have “nuestros hermanos” who want to be big, to be in all the photos and to always have a word while, simultaneously, also wanting to continue to receive funds, because they are still poor, and cannot just suddenly enrich, in a purely statistical way. It is a schizophrenia that limits, for now, Spanish ambitions (in the EU; not in Portugal).

So, who is giving out the money, wanting to control its destiny? From Germany, the United Kingdom, France (not much, in relative terms), Netherlands (a lot, too much, taking into account its dimension), Sweden, Denmark and Italy (little). And for whom does the money go to, not wanting to irritate their financiers? It used to go to Ireland (that went from a “country of cohesion” to the second richest country of the EU in terms of per capita product – just after Luxembourg), it goes to Spain (the main beneficiary in absolute terms), to Greece (theold poorest member of the old poor members of the Union) and, of course, to Portugal (you guessed it: the current poorest member of the old poor countries of the Union; poorer than the two richest of the ten relatively poor countries in terms of the EU average that entered the club on the 1st May of 2004: Cyprus and Slovenia; and very soon poorer than two others: Malta and the Czech Republic).

Good Luck

Blair has an extraordinary task in hands: to quickly convince continentals to radically alter the allocation of money in the process of European integration, dedicating it to vanguard areas; and to convince, in the short-term, his fellow countrymen that this Europe of innovation, without CAP, with a large and deepened Single Market, that is more demanding in the application of structural funds, is worth it, it is fundamental for this process of European transformation that the United Kingdom (UK) adheres to the Single Currency. It is for this Herculean task of Blair that many in Europe look at expectation (starting with Durão Barroso, who has been going through complicated times since he assumed the Presidency of the European Commission – supported by, rember, the UK). If it comes through, Blair’s Europe will be a very different Europe. With a coordinated Defence sector but without aprioristic ambitions of counter-power against the USA. With the euro and a Single Market even more developed. With a big role for the Members-States (MS) and great caution towards advances considered as federalist (with that point, France will keep agreeing to). It will be a Europe that will reform its social-economic model that is so pressured by demography and global competition. And It will also be a more demanding Europe on what concerns security and, possibly, more attentive and selective in relation to immigration. It will be less cohesive and more competitive. With less funds of cohesion but with renewed opportunities for the most dynamic MS (and more risks for those who are incapable of reforming themselves and compete). If he achieves it, Blair will be making History. If he obtains an agreement in the Financial Perspectives, reforming the CAP and the English rebate and if, afterwards, he brings the UK closer to the European Union and to the Euro, Blair will be justly referenced in future historical pages relative to the beginnings of the XXI century of the “Old Continent”. Good Luck.

“Demain ne sera pas comme hier, il sera nouveau et dépendra de nous”[1]

Local elections are nearing. It is a moment for speeches and promises. For inaugurations and (particularly) wide political smiles. Time for new demands (and for the renewal of old ones), for stickers, electrical appliances (was it true?) and little flags. A time very often for a dangerous discrediting of the political system. In a context of deep changes in the role of local government (in which they can affirm themselves or not as promoters of development) and of great budget limitations, it is more and more important to define, together with the population and other actors of regional development, the priorities of public local action. What does the population want from its councillors? How to adjust public spheres to a world in transformation, allowing the Administration to be at the same time creative and renown? What is our collective project? What mobilizes us? These are some of the questions I would like to, at least see being considered and debated during the next electoral campaign. To decide about my vote, I am going to look for ideas and projects for the region. Someone who throws challenges to the population and to the actors of development. Who understands the importance of the economy and growing competition (increasingly also between local councils) in the caption and maintenance of knowledge, talents and investments. Someone who associates strategy and actors, public and private, cooperative and entrepreneurial. That says what he want to do and with whom he wants to do it with. That promotes the participation of actors, committing them and hold them co-responsible for the future. That understands that the collective intelligence of a region is far from just concerning the public sector. And that from that perception draws conclusions. Someone who, basically, believes, in permanence without hesitations that “tomorrow will not be as yesterday, it will be new and will depend on us”.

[1] Extract of “Phénoménologie du temps et prospective” (Gaston Berger, 1964).

NON

The French have said “no” to the European Constitutional Treaty (CT). And, at the same time, it seems they have said “no” to everything except to the CT’s text.
They said “no” to the French government and to Chirac (“Non à la Constitution, au government, à Chirac”, was one of the slogans used by the defenders of “no”), to the growing unemployment, to the enlargements of the European Union (EU) that limit the French privileges and to market liberalization. But it does not seem like they have actually said “no” to the CT’s text. This is so because, in spite of the CT being more than a mere compilation of the previous Treatises (the form in which it is being presented by labour in the United Kingdom), it is not, most definetely, responsible by the amalgam of French refusals. The CT collects the Treaties, making them more legible (in spite of the text still being very extensive and detailed) and brings about some novelties relatively to Nice (the reigning Treaty), but not as much as it may seem (nothing compared to the Treaty of Maastricht, for example). And, above all, it does not seem to be to those novelties that the French said “no”. Have they said “no” to the inclusion in the CT of the Fundamental Rights Charter? Have they said “no” to the new counting of votes in the Council (less polemic than the one it pretends to substitute, that is, the one agreed to in Nice)? Have they said “no” to the little novelties in terms of the exclusive competences of the EU and to the greater use of qualified majority voting? Have they said “no” to the clarification of competences delimitation between EU and the Members-States (SM)?
Have they said “no” to the possibility of a structured permanent cooperation between some MS concerning a Common Security and Defence Policy? Have they said “no” to the definition of relationship mechanisms between the EU and the MS that wish to abandon it? Have they said “no” to the new office of a Foreign Minister of the EU? Or to the new office of President of the European Council? Have they said “no” to the end of the 3 pillar structure and to the assumption of the EU as an entity which has its own juridical personality? I do not think so.But, then, if the French did not say no to the CT’s novelties, what did they say no to? In my perspective, unfortunately, the French said “no” to what the CT symbolizes, that is, to the continuation, at least in the current settings, of the process of European integration. And it is here that a very serious problem arises. Everyone seems to say that the French “no” represents the need to change the integration process in Europe (without understanding, in very concrete terms, what it si that it actually means: more protectionism? More subsidies? More taxes? Less enlargements’? More influence of the “big”? But influence of the “big” when it comes to the economy, the military, demography? Or to the importance they systematically attribute to themselves?). And very few seem to say something that seems obvious to me: the European integration process is an open movement (on what concerns the participation of states), reformist and demanding. If the French legally refuse it, it does not mean the European refuse it. If the French (understandably but unfortunately) refuse a European integration process that has always benefit them (look at the Common Agricultural Policy and the Single Currency, for example) but tends to benefit them less in the future, that does not means that the Europeans do not want it. The problem of the French “no” is french and european. But it remains more French than European. Europe does not have to change to satisfy the French. Europe has to evolve to correspond to the expectations of europeans. And if the Europeans are interested in trailing routes that the French do not accept, then the EU will have to confront the French with their options. If it does not do that, it will always be under threat of French veto and judgement.
Europe is not France. And this is the fundamental moment to make it clear. Mesdames et Messieurs, les portes sont toujours ouvertes.

Who is going to pay the interest?

Everyone seems happy with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) agreed by the Finance Ministers of the European Union (EU). It is, in fact, a reason to smile. It is as if, at the end of the year, we would put together in an Assembly all the people who were fined this year and had as the only point in the agenda: “to forgive or not to forgive the traffic fines”. It is not difficult to guess the decision… “It would be handy” for almost every Government to change the SGP. And so it was changed. And everybody was a happy chap. Everybody? No, some irresolute and strange economists still say that the stability of European public finances is not only a question that is very sensitive to political interests (not all of them are so “noble” as our technologic shock; believe it or not, there are those who expect to win elections more easily with this renewed ability to easily spend/invest…) but also, above all, it is a fundamental basis for economic growth. The message that came across about the SGP (“we created it but, after all, it is too rigid for the expenses/investments we want/have the need to do, so we have to make it more flexible”) increases the pressure on the interest rates in the euro zone (towards its increase, of course), making the commitment of sanitizing the public accounts of the Member-States less incisive and giving a bigger room for the public induction of the rise in prices. This inflationist pressure will be fought by the European Central Bank (ECB) with the rise of the interest rates. And when, in one of the next meetings, the ECB raises reference interests rates, the many Portuguese who bought, with great effort, their own houses, has to send the “bill” to the men and ladies of the Left Block and the Communist Party (for example) that so much attacked the ignoble monster called SGP. Fact remains that the fashion was, almost from the start, to attack the SGP, to blame it for the weak economic performance and the increase in unemployment, among other bad things. No one (or very few) said what it was actually for. Now, unfortunately, it is going to be understood. And the Portuguese with house loans will be some of the first.

China and Oil

China: after the end of Civil War, the formal constitution of Mao Tsé-tung’s Democratic Republic of China occurred in 1949. Shortly afterwards, in South-east Asia, the collision between Chinese and north-American interests leads up to the internationalization of the Korean War (immediately, and despite the high number of casualties, contention worked, the Korean War remained a war of regional proportions). Mao Tsé-tung’s China then began the “Cultural Revolution” which ended up dying with its creator in 1976. From then onwards the Chinese way solidifies (already initiated, though probably unconsciously, by the Sino-American Shanghai communication in 1972, marking the conciliation of interests between China and USA, in regards to the soviet giant) in direction towards a pragmatic model of incorporation of “market” in socialism, and making China, in the present day, an undeniable actor in a reflection about world’s evolution in the XXI century.Oil: it is undeniable that “black gold” has been proving itself worthy of the comparison with the precious metal. In 1973, the agreement involving the limitation of production and the rise of the price of the oil barrel (triggered by a critique of Israel’s expansionism and to the rules of international commerce) was initiated by OPEP and led to an economic crisis of great proportions in the economies of the western powers (with the USA at the forefront). Already before (1970), the USA had achieved the maximum of its oil production (peak oil), which is classified by some authors [1] as the most important economic event of the last fifty years: north-American supremacy in terms of the international oil market (obtained through production in American soil) was about to end. – something that became dramatically clear, as I referred, three years later. But oil was also craftily used by the USA (specially by Reagan from 1981 onwards) during the “arms race”, not only when trying to deny access to some important equipments for oil exploration to the soviets by, for example, supporting regional conflicts that were stressful for the USSR such as Afghanistan and instilling Saudi Arabia to sell oil (a lot of it and at cheap prices) so that it would make more difficult for the USSR to finance the arms race through oil revenues. Finally, in 1987 the USSR reached its peak oil (not long before the brutal fall of Soviet economy which preceded the dismantlement of the empire). Today oil is the centre of attentions once again, not just due to speculation about the reasons of USA’s intervention in Iraq but also in consequence of the increasing consensus surrounding the true question of global peak oil being “when is it going to take place?” and not “is it going to happen?”.China and oil: it is almost common sense to look at China, a country that does not produce oil, like a certain strategic and economic power of the new century. It is also common sense that the reach of global peak oil will have serious consequences at economic and social levels – just think about industrial dependence on crude. It is also not a common thought the one that China’s high rates of economic and urbanization/industrialization growth can prove themselves unsustainable, with the oil barrel costing, for example, 80 dollars. In this case, the very solidity of the imaginative Chinese model would be questioned, with grave consequences not just for China but also, understandably, to the whole global economy.

[1] See, for example, HEINBERG, Richard – Smoking Gun: The CIA’s Interest in Peak Oil. In CAMPBELL, C.J.; HILL, Staball, comp. – “ASPO Newsletter No 33 – September 2003”, pp.7-8 (disponível em http://www.cge.uevora.pt/energia/Newsletter33.doc).

Who are you?

It is not easy to talk about civilizations nowadays. I mean, it isn’t, above all, politically correct to do so. Ever since Samuel Huntington published, in the summer of 1993, the famous article in which he associated the word “clash” with civilizations that the discussion around these millenary entities has been violent. The international political environment (Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, Iraq, 11th September, North Korea, etc) has not, obviously, been blind to the referred enthusiasm.
Using this reading grid as a possible alternative to face the critiques directed towards an analysis based purely on the nation-state, I propose a brief look on the civilization’s optic of the western “proponent-regulator”.
Looking at the world, it seems clear that the so called Western Civilization does not form a coherent whole or an indistinctive one, since it can be, for example, between Europeans and north-Americans and between Catholics and Protestants. It is relatively close to the Jewish (with a very relevant power not only in Israel but also in the USA, in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands) and to the orthodox (these divided between Greek and Slavic). As it happens in most of religions, Catholics too could be divided between progressive and integrators, while it is also important to notice the growing importance of Evangelicals in countries like Brazil and the USA.

The West “manages” its relation with the orthodox fundamentalists through security (i.e. NATO’s enlargement), through political and economic integration (i.e. EU) and of Investment (i.e. boom of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) fluxes in the 90’s). It is also the FDI that brings the Western and Confucians world closer together with a global perception that the Chinese sleeping giant is waking up very quickly (we will see if international reserves of hydrocarbon will allow it). The same happens between Hindu India and the West (i.e. the importance of FDI in India in watering down the tensions with Pakistan), between Japan and the West (with the central difference being that Japan shares with the West the big decisions of global economic and finance regulation) and between Latin America and the West (the ALCA is only one of the attempts).
Africa, however, seems to continue to be forgotten about, being important however to accompany the emergence of some countries as significant oil producers (West Africa) and the geopolitical role held by African countries of Islamic civilization (like Libya, Egypt and Sudan). This last civilization, in the centre of the more recent geopolitical hurricane, is profoundly divided. Some examples: Shiites vs. Sunnis; Arabs vs. Turks vs. Malays vs. Persians. Turkey, which takes part in NATO and is a candidate to enter the EU. Indonesia is an ally of the USA (the same with Morocco, Egypt and Saudi Arabia – though the relation between this state, where the holy places of Islam are, and the USA have been deteriorating a lot since 9/11). Pakistan is a partner (though “a slippery one”). Iraq is, at the moment, under the control of USA forces. Nonetheless, it seems undeniable that the question “Who are you?” substituted “on which side are you?”, traditionally linked to profoundly ideological conflicts like the Spanish Civil War, the Cold War or even the Second World War. The problem is that “Who are you?” suffers from a rigidity and therefore of flammability which is way more evident. …
[2] See Boniface, Pascal: “Guerras do Amanhã”, Editorial Inquérito, 2003; Huntington, Samuel P. [et al.]: “O Choque das Civilizações – O debate sobre a tese de Samuel P. Huntington”, Gradiva, 1999; Huntington, Samuel P.: “O Choque das Civilizações e a Mudança na Ordem Mundial”, Gradiva, 1999.