Give it a decent funeral

On the aftermath of the French and Dutch “no” to the Constitutional Treaty of European Union, the 25 heads of State met in Brussels, on that occasion the European Council declared:
“The citizens express worries and reservations that should be taking into consideration. It is, therefore, necessary to proceed with a due reflection about this happening. This reflection period would be used to carry out in each of our countries a wide debate, with which citizens, civil society, social partners and national parliaments will be associated, as well as political parties. (…) We made an appointment for the first semester of 2006 in order to proceed with a global appreciation of the national debates…”

A wide debate? To which citizens, civil society, social partners and political parties will be associated? Political parties? One almost feels like say nothing deserves to be said such is the shallowness of the words. The debate does not exist, it is not promoted, it does not have interest neither from potential promoters nor from potential participants. The Portuguese Prime Minister signed an empty, subjective and discouraging declaration of intentions, in which the small print seems to affirm in a loud voice: “the Constitutional Treaty died, it is buried and is irrecoverable. We are only going to try and recover some parts to see if we get along together at 25. Also because the current treaty, the treaty of Nice only triggered debate for a single reason: the need for its revision.”

The fact is that the Constitutional Treaty really did die, and the later the burial, the more commotion it will cause. The Constitutional Treaty only could come alive if all the Members States of the European Union had ratified it. France said “no”. The Netherlands said “no”. Czech Republic postponed the referendum that was supposed to be in June 2006. Denmark postponed the referendum supposed to be on the 27th September. Ireland also delayed the referendum, just as Portugal did. The United Kingdom delayed the referendum and the parliamentary ratification. And Sweden delayed the latter.
The Constitutional Treaty will not come into practice. Perhaps it will be possible to make the most out of some less polemic novelties, namely on what concerns the simplification of treaties and the transparency of the European Union. Just give it a decent funeral. As quickly as possible.

“The idea of there not being anyone in this country is unbearable: I have to run for elections”

In 1985, the Socialist Party candidate to the next presidential elections unabatedly signed the Treaty for Portugal’s entry into the European Union. This was the first political act in Portugal that I accompanied with enthusiasm. It was a victory for Portugal and it definitely put us in the route to Europe and to development. In 1986, the candidate from the left on the next presidential elections was elected, for the first time, PR. These were the first elections in my memory, where I supported, in an active and emotional way, Mário Soares. In 1991, Mário Soares was overwhelming re-elected PR (even then, the phenomenon of the “void” already showed some signs). Possible future PR, probable future PR, Socialist Party candidate to the next presidential elections, candidate of the left to the next presidential elections, Mário Soares. I apologize for repeating myself, but I do not get tired of repeating it, since they tell me that it is true, I read it on the newspapers, but I still cannot believe it. As I write this article, Wednesday, the 31st August, early morning, I still have a small hope that he will back down at the last moment (but, deep down I know it is not going to happen). The candidacy of Mário Soares, a unique man in the Portuguese history of the second half of the 21st century, represents the complete failure in the renovation of the political system, a kind of generational politic scleroses (with its origins in Mário Soares’ generation but also, although to a smaller extent, in Cavaco’s one) that halted the renovation, settling in its own failure (of being able to put together parties and bring about capable politic leaders) the reason of its maintenance in power. “There is no one else, I have to advance”, must have thought Mário Soares when he decided to decide to be a candidate for candidate. It is this “no one” that worries me. Is it, as it seems, that there really is not anyone else in the Portuguese left (the right is not much better) capable of presenting himself as a strong candidate to PR in the beginning of the XXI century? And is it the case that, because there is no one else, exactly one of those responsible for this void is going to be elected, taking into account the long-term exercise of party power by Mário Soares. Honestly, the next presidential elections deserved the occurrence of surprises. To the left and to the right. Somebody that would challenge this “back-and-forth” of “addicts” to power and history. That would halt the paradox in the genesis of this process that may not be more than an intimate dialog of the kind: “the idea of the Socialist Party, my Socialist Party, giving its support to a comrade more dedicated to Arts than to electoral victories is unbearable; the idea of the Socialist Party, my Socialist Party, supporting Freitas do Amaral is even more unbearable; the idea of not being anyone in this country is unbearable: I have to run for elections ”

NON

The French have said “no” to the European Constitutional Treaty (CT). And, at the same time, it seems they have said “no” to everything except to the CT’s text.
They said “no” to the French government and to Chirac (“Non à la Constitution, au government, à Chirac”, was one of the slogans used by the defenders of “no”), to the growing unemployment, to the enlargements of the European Union (EU) that limit the French privileges and to market liberalization. But it does not seem like they have actually said “no” to the CT’s text. This is so because, in spite of the CT being more than a mere compilation of the previous Treatises (the form in which it is being presented by labour in the United Kingdom), it is not, most definetely, responsible by the amalgam of French refusals. The CT collects the Treaties, making them more legible (in spite of the text still being very extensive and detailed) and brings about some novelties relatively to Nice (the reigning Treaty), but not as much as it may seem (nothing compared to the Treaty of Maastricht, for example). And, above all, it does not seem to be to those novelties that the French said “no”. Have they said “no” to the inclusion in the CT of the Fundamental Rights Charter? Have they said “no” to the new counting of votes in the Council (less polemic than the one it pretends to substitute, that is, the one agreed to in Nice)? Have they said “no” to the little novelties in terms of the exclusive competences of the EU and to the greater use of qualified majority voting? Have they said “no” to the clarification of competences delimitation between EU and the Members-States (SM)?
Have they said “no” to the possibility of a structured permanent cooperation between some MS concerning a Common Security and Defence Policy? Have they said “no” to the definition of relationship mechanisms between the EU and the MS that wish to abandon it? Have they said “no” to the new office of a Foreign Minister of the EU? Or to the new office of President of the European Council? Have they said “no” to the end of the 3 pillar structure and to the assumption of the EU as an entity which has its own juridical personality? I do not think so.But, then, if the French did not say no to the CT’s novelties, what did they say no to? In my perspective, unfortunately, the French said “no” to what the CT symbolizes, that is, to the continuation, at least in the current settings, of the process of European integration. And it is here that a very serious problem arises. Everyone seems to say that the French “no” represents the need to change the integration process in Europe (without understanding, in very concrete terms, what it si that it actually means: more protectionism? More subsidies? More taxes? Less enlargements’? More influence of the “big”? But influence of the “big” when it comes to the economy, the military, demography? Or to the importance they systematically attribute to themselves?). And very few seem to say something that seems obvious to me: the European integration process is an open movement (on what concerns the participation of states), reformist and demanding. If the French legally refuse it, it does not mean the European refuse it. If the French (understandably but unfortunately) refuse a European integration process that has always benefit them (look at the Common Agricultural Policy and the Single Currency, for example) but tends to benefit them less in the future, that does not means that the Europeans do not want it. The problem of the French “no” is french and european. But it remains more French than European. Europe does not have to change to satisfy the French. Europe has to evolve to correspond to the expectations of europeans. And if the Europeans are interested in trailing routes that the French do not accept, then the EU will have to confront the French with their options. If it does not do that, it will always be under threat of French veto and judgement.
Europe is not France. And this is the fundamental moment to make it clear. Mesdames et Messieurs, les portes sont toujours ouvertes.