What if it all goes well?

“To go well” is, of course, subjective. It is even more subjective when we are talking about European integration, with its entanglement of questions and trends and a group of actors whose interests are often distinct.
But, in this time of pessimism, it appears to me that it can be interesting to reflect about a positive scenario of equilibrium in the future course of the integration process. A scenario in which the train of integration does not suddenly brake.
Lets then imagine a group of possible evolutions for the positions of four of the key EU actors in the next decade:
Throughout the next decade, France would accept the gradual reduction of the Common Agricultural Policy’s (CAP) weight on the communitarian budget, at the same time it started a process of structural internal reforms which, while transforming the French capitalist system, would bring about good results in terms of economic growth. At the international level, French leaders would clearly understand the disadvantages of a permanent attempt of international affirmation in opposition to the USA, which would allow for the construction of a strong bond between the two powers (for example at the level of defence), empowering the dynamism of the European defence industry and of the progressive affirmation of an effective European identity of defence within NATO. This would be a France with a new generation of politicians in power (perhaps Sarkozy, perhaps Villepin), without Chirac or Jospin and very hardly with Fabius.
Germany, in spite of the economic difficulties and of initial internal costs of the structural reforms (successful in the medium term), would accept to continue to play its part as the biggest contributor (in liquid terms) towards the communitarian budget. On the other hand, already far away from the scars of the Second World War, it would assume greater international prominence, which would be reflected upon, among other things, membership into the United Nations Security Council. These evolutions could happen with a central block government in Germany led by Merkel or by CDU / Free Democrats coalitions (with or without the Greens) or SPD with the Greens.
An EU that would be closer to the USA (more of a partner, less of a rival) would lead to a greater popularity of the EU in the United Kingdom. This improvement of EU’s image would have as is most remarkable facts the gradual reduction of the “British rebate” and, especially, the United Kingdom’s support for the “Economic and Monetary Union”. The natural successor of Blair (Gordon Brown) seems to be the suitable person make these evolutions possible, which would presuppose the continuation of the prolonged absence from power of the Conservative Party.
Lastly, the Netherlands, fearful of migration pressures but confident of an EU which managed to persuade the UK to adhere to the euro and which accepted the reduction of the Dutch liquid contribution towards the communitarian budget, would participate in the consolidation process of a collection of Europeans policies in regards to Internal and Justice Affairs (IJA). These policies would prove quite a lot more efficient than in the past, when it comes to, for example, immigration control (leaving, however, some room for maneuver by the member states). This Dutch evolution would implicate that populists would be keeping away from power and, probably, that the Liberals would have a key-role in the government’s coalitions.

Give it a decent funeral

On the aftermath of the French and Dutch “no” to the Constitutional Treaty of European Union, the 25 heads of State met in Brussels, on that occasion the European Council declared:
“The citizens express worries and reservations that should be taking into consideration. It is, therefore, necessary to proceed with a due reflection about this happening. This reflection period would be used to carry out in each of our countries a wide debate, with which citizens, civil society, social partners and national parliaments will be associated, as well as political parties. (…) We made an appointment for the first semester of 2006 in order to proceed with a global appreciation of the national debates…”

A wide debate? To which citizens, civil society, social partners and political parties will be associated? Political parties? One almost feels like say nothing deserves to be said such is the shallowness of the words. The debate does not exist, it is not promoted, it does not have interest neither from potential promoters nor from potential participants. The Portuguese Prime Minister signed an empty, subjective and discouraging declaration of intentions, in which the small print seems to affirm in a loud voice: “the Constitutional Treaty died, it is buried and is irrecoverable. We are only going to try and recover some parts to see if we get along together at 25. Also because the current treaty, the treaty of Nice only triggered debate for a single reason: the need for its revision.”

The fact is that the Constitutional Treaty really did die, and the later the burial, the more commotion it will cause. The Constitutional Treaty only could come alive if all the Members States of the European Union had ratified it. France said “no”. The Netherlands said “no”. Czech Republic postponed the referendum that was supposed to be in June 2006. Denmark postponed the referendum supposed to be on the 27th September. Ireland also delayed the referendum, just as Portugal did. The United Kingdom delayed the referendum and the parliamentary ratification. And Sweden delayed the latter.
The Constitutional Treaty will not come into practice. Perhaps it will be possible to make the most out of some less polemic novelties, namely on what concerns the simplification of treaties and the transparency of the European Union. Just give it a decent funeral. As quickly as possible.