What if it all goes well?

“To go well” is, of course, subjective. It is even more subjective when we are talking about European integration, with its entanglement of questions and trends and a group of actors whose interests are often distinct.
But, in this time of pessimism, it appears to me that it can be interesting to reflect about a positive scenario of equilibrium in the future course of the integration process. A scenario in which the train of integration does not suddenly brake.
Lets then imagine a group of possible evolutions for the positions of four of the key EU actors in the next decade:
Throughout the next decade, France would accept the gradual reduction of the Common Agricultural Policy’s (CAP) weight on the communitarian budget, at the same time it started a process of structural internal reforms which, while transforming the French capitalist system, would bring about good results in terms of economic growth. At the international level, French leaders would clearly understand the disadvantages of a permanent attempt of international affirmation in opposition to the USA, which would allow for the construction of a strong bond between the two powers (for example at the level of defence), empowering the dynamism of the European defence industry and of the progressive affirmation of an effective European identity of defence within NATO. This would be a France with a new generation of politicians in power (perhaps Sarkozy, perhaps Villepin), without Chirac or Jospin and very hardly with Fabius.
Germany, in spite of the economic difficulties and of initial internal costs of the structural reforms (successful in the medium term), would accept to continue to play its part as the biggest contributor (in liquid terms) towards the communitarian budget. On the other hand, already far away from the scars of the Second World War, it would assume greater international prominence, which would be reflected upon, among other things, membership into the United Nations Security Council. These evolutions could happen with a central block government in Germany led by Merkel or by CDU / Free Democrats coalitions (with or without the Greens) or SPD with the Greens.
An EU that would be closer to the USA (more of a partner, less of a rival) would lead to a greater popularity of the EU in the United Kingdom. This improvement of EU’s image would have as is most remarkable facts the gradual reduction of the “British rebate” and, especially, the United Kingdom’s support for the “Economic and Monetary Union”. The natural successor of Blair (Gordon Brown) seems to be the suitable person make these evolutions possible, which would presuppose the continuation of the prolonged absence from power of the Conservative Party.
Lastly, the Netherlands, fearful of migration pressures but confident of an EU which managed to persuade the UK to adhere to the euro and which accepted the reduction of the Dutch liquid contribution towards the communitarian budget, would participate in the consolidation process of a collection of Europeans policies in regards to Internal and Justice Affairs (IJA). These policies would prove quite a lot more efficient than in the past, when it comes to, for example, immigration control (leaving, however, some room for maneuver by the member states). This Dutch evolution would implicate that populists would be keeping away from power and, probably, that the Liberals would have a key-role in the government’s coalitions.

NON

The French have said “no” to the European Constitutional Treaty (CT). And, at the same time, it seems they have said “no” to everything except to the CT’s text.
They said “no” to the French government and to Chirac (“Non à la Constitution, au government, à Chirac”, was one of the slogans used by the defenders of “no”), to the growing unemployment, to the enlargements of the European Union (EU) that limit the French privileges and to market liberalization. But it does not seem like they have actually said “no” to the CT’s text. This is so because, in spite of the CT being more than a mere compilation of the previous Treatises (the form in which it is being presented by labour in the United Kingdom), it is not, most definetely, responsible by the amalgam of French refusals. The CT collects the Treaties, making them more legible (in spite of the text still being very extensive and detailed) and brings about some novelties relatively to Nice (the reigning Treaty), but not as much as it may seem (nothing compared to the Treaty of Maastricht, for example). And, above all, it does not seem to be to those novelties that the French said “no”. Have they said “no” to the inclusion in the CT of the Fundamental Rights Charter? Have they said “no” to the new counting of votes in the Council (less polemic than the one it pretends to substitute, that is, the one agreed to in Nice)? Have they said “no” to the little novelties in terms of the exclusive competences of the EU and to the greater use of qualified majority voting? Have they said “no” to the clarification of competences delimitation between EU and the Members-States (SM)?
Have they said “no” to the possibility of a structured permanent cooperation between some MS concerning a Common Security and Defence Policy? Have they said “no” to the definition of relationship mechanisms between the EU and the MS that wish to abandon it? Have they said “no” to the new office of a Foreign Minister of the EU? Or to the new office of President of the European Council? Have they said “no” to the end of the 3 pillar structure and to the assumption of the EU as an entity which has its own juridical personality? I do not think so.But, then, if the French did not say no to the CT’s novelties, what did they say no to? In my perspective, unfortunately, the French said “no” to what the CT symbolizes, that is, to the continuation, at least in the current settings, of the process of European integration. And it is here that a very serious problem arises. Everyone seems to say that the French “no” represents the need to change the integration process in Europe (without understanding, in very concrete terms, what it si that it actually means: more protectionism? More subsidies? More taxes? Less enlargements’? More influence of the “big”? But influence of the “big” when it comes to the economy, the military, demography? Or to the importance they systematically attribute to themselves?). And very few seem to say something that seems obvious to me: the European integration process is an open movement (on what concerns the participation of states), reformist and demanding. If the French legally refuse it, it does not mean the European refuse it. If the French (understandably but unfortunately) refuse a European integration process that has always benefit them (look at the Common Agricultural Policy and the Single Currency, for example) but tends to benefit them less in the future, that does not means that the Europeans do not want it. The problem of the French “no” is french and european. But it remains more French than European. Europe does not have to change to satisfy the French. Europe has to evolve to correspond to the expectations of europeans. And if the Europeans are interested in trailing routes that the French do not accept, then the EU will have to confront the French with their options. If it does not do that, it will always be under threat of French veto and judgement.
Europe is not France. And this is the fundamental moment to make it clear. Mesdames et Messieurs, les portes sont toujours ouvertes.