A per capita country and the Lebanon war (with Europe in between)

Time for holidays, of unpretentious readings (how I miss the Summer of the “Da Vinci Code”…) and of futilities to relax. Parties with sardines or vodka, with foam or salami. Going south, to the coast, towards a heat that is attenuated by the sea.

Escaping the everyday buzz to try and understand it better. Everything is in pre-epoch in Portugal. Everything is ok. Those who can, go to the hotel. Those who sort of can, rent a place and share the costs with family and friends. Those who almost can’t, try to enjoy a couple of escapes to the beach. Those who cannot, either pretend they can or stay at home.

We are important people and that allows us to go on holidays in a relaxed manner. We are important, not only because we are one of the four better football squads of the world, but also because our C-130 travels, “at UN’s request”, between Italy and Beirut. And it is the only one. The national logic and the journalistic presentation of these two “important things” is more or less the same. One like the other let us at ease with ourselves.

On the one hand, we are good at doing what we like, that is, to play football (and everything associated to it: from Super Bock to cafe chit chat). All this despite us being a small country, make notice therefore that, in per capita terms, we clearly were the world champions.

On the other hand, we do per capita our very meaningful part, in helping the international effort to respond to the conflict in Lebanon. I repeat, our C-130 travels, “at UN’s request”, between Italy and Beirut to transport humanitarian aid. And it is the only one. Drawn in jealousy super-powers. It is on these little details that great nations define themselves!

Strangely, nobody seems ask why the hell is our C-130 the only one doing this work. But this does not matter. What matters is that it is the only one and it is Portuguese and that Portugal, in spite of being a small country, leads the aerial humanitarian effort to help the victims of the bombardments. That really puts me at ease. What else could we have done? It already had been our Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) who had asked for a special meeting of the MFA of the EU about this subject and now we had our plane that just keeps landing in Beirut filled with humanitarian aid.

It is true that, once again, the EU was completely incapable of taking a common stance that someone understands. It is also true that the international intervention plan in this conflict seems to be peacefully (to give Israel more time to do its “work”) prepared by the USA, by talking to those that matter. And, in Europe, it is France and the United Kingdom that matters (and, in a second level, Germany and Italy). The EU does not have armed forces prepared to die by the orders of the President of the Commission of of the European Parliament or of the Council. In Foreign Policy and Defence, the EU could be a vision or a Project, but it is not (I do not know if it must be) a reality.

As I have said before, us Portuguese, are at ease because we have already done what we could. Nowadays we are in the need of holidays, of pink magazines, of “Da Vinci Code” sequels, of open-air discos and pretty people. Pretty people like those who appeared on Beirut’s photography, the Paris of the Middle East, once again bombarded on a daily basis. Many of those pretty people should already have gone out of the city and the country (at least pretty people with appropriated nationality, that is, not Lebanese, and/or with enough money).
In Lebanon and Israel, the war became once again an everyday affair, occulting, among other tragedies, the Iraqi (only a man with the charisma of Fidel Castro managed to rival media-wise with an Israeli-Arab war; and, even so, only if the intensity of bombardments and the clarity of the mutilated bodies’ images is not enough).
I try to read something about what happens.
I knew there was an UN resolution to disarm Hezbollah and that, if something is certain, is that Hezbollah was not disarmed (thousands of missiles moved in lorries usually do not result from a well succeeded disarmament). It is true that the fact that Hezbollah, supported by Syria and a pro-nuclear Iran (remember?), violating the international line that separates (separated?) Israel from Lebanon, attacking Israeli soldiers and kidnapping two of them is not exactly an act of peace.

It is true that the non-recognition of the state of Israel state by Hezbollah, by Hamas and the successive declarations of Iranian representatives are not exactly an act of approximation to Israel, a small country in permanent state of war and fighting for survival.

It is true that Israel’s response is brutal, perhaps disproportional (but disproportional to what?, the two soldiers’ life or to the existence of a nation?). It is true that the news and the images that arrive to us are extreme.
I do not really know where to find guidance from. I will just stay here. Reading, Talking and trying to understand a bit better. Good holidays.

What if it all goes well?

“To go well” is, of course, subjective. It is even more subjective when we are talking about European integration, with its entanglement of questions and trends and a group of actors whose interests are often distinct.
But, in this time of pessimism, it appears to me that it can be interesting to reflect about a positive scenario of equilibrium in the future course of the integration process. A scenario in which the train of integration does not suddenly brake.
Lets then imagine a group of possible evolutions for the positions of four of the key EU actors in the next decade:
Throughout the next decade, France would accept the gradual reduction of the Common Agricultural Policy’s (CAP) weight on the communitarian budget, at the same time it started a process of structural internal reforms which, while transforming the French capitalist system, would bring about good results in terms of economic growth. At the international level, French leaders would clearly understand the disadvantages of a permanent attempt of international affirmation in opposition to the USA, which would allow for the construction of a strong bond between the two powers (for example at the level of defence), empowering the dynamism of the European defence industry and of the progressive affirmation of an effective European identity of defence within NATO. This would be a France with a new generation of politicians in power (perhaps Sarkozy, perhaps Villepin), without Chirac or Jospin and very hardly with Fabius.
Germany, in spite of the economic difficulties and of initial internal costs of the structural reforms (successful in the medium term), would accept to continue to play its part as the biggest contributor (in liquid terms) towards the communitarian budget. On the other hand, already far away from the scars of the Second World War, it would assume greater international prominence, which would be reflected upon, among other things, membership into the United Nations Security Council. These evolutions could happen with a central block government in Germany led by Merkel or by CDU / Free Democrats coalitions (with or without the Greens) or SPD with the Greens.
An EU that would be closer to the USA (more of a partner, less of a rival) would lead to a greater popularity of the EU in the United Kingdom. This improvement of EU’s image would have as is most remarkable facts the gradual reduction of the “British rebate” and, especially, the United Kingdom’s support for the “Economic and Monetary Union”. The natural successor of Blair (Gordon Brown) seems to be the suitable person make these evolutions possible, which would presuppose the continuation of the prolonged absence from power of the Conservative Party.
Lastly, the Netherlands, fearful of migration pressures but confident of an EU which managed to persuade the UK to adhere to the euro and which accepted the reduction of the Dutch liquid contribution towards the communitarian budget, would participate in the consolidation process of a collection of Europeans policies in regards to Internal and Justice Affairs (IJA). These policies would prove quite a lot more efficient than in the past, when it comes to, for example, immigration control (leaving, however, some room for maneuver by the member states). This Dutch evolution would implicate that populists would be keeping away from power and, probably, that the Liberals would have a key-role in the government’s coalitions.

Money: Wanted

In the European Union (EU), with the terrorist tension in turmoil, the difficulties in economic growth and the sensitivity of the questions related to immigration and border control increasing, the concept of Independent State has gained terrain to the idea of Member State ( “Member-State”, and therefore, co-responsible for group decisions and for the success of their implementation). Only this explains all the tension about the EU’s budget, that is, about 1% of EU’s product (a national budget is usually situated between 45 and 50%of the national product). With the reinforcement of the importance of nationality and the difficulties in growth and in job creation, the “old buddies” have started counting each euro. Looking at the “old” 15 (not counting with Luxembourg), I will briefly refer to a basic difference that, among others, structures the relationship between States in the EU: there are those that pay and those that receive, that is, some Members States are net contributors for the EU’s budget, while others benefit from the referred budget.

When they seat at the negotiation table, the difference between those who contribute for the thin budget of the EU and those who benefit from it over and over again is clear. If I give the money to someone, I can demand some conditions. If I receive the money, I can, in as much, be a “good student” (I can also be a “bad student” here and there as long as such behaviour does not turn into a rule on the eyes of those who pay me, running the risk of having my nice sponsor simply stopping the payments). It is because of this (but not only) that only the more uninformed thought that Germany could be fined for having a deficit of about 4% of the product. It will be enough, through the German perspective, having offered its national currency to be ran together with those gentlemen and ladies of the south Europe that deserve little trust and to having been, since always, (and by far) the biggest net contributor (in absolute values) to the communitarian budget. “Enough! The Second World War ended 50 years ago and we (Germans) have enough problems with our economy and our development model.” On the other side of the barricade we have “nuestros hermanos” who want to be big, to be in all the photos and to always have a word while, simultaneously, also wanting to continue to receive funds, because they are still poor, and cannot just suddenly enrich, in a purely statistical way. It is a schizophrenia that limits, for now, Spanish ambitions (in the EU; not in Portugal).

So, who is giving out the money, wanting to control its destiny? From Germany, the United Kingdom, France (not much, in relative terms), Netherlands (a lot, too much, taking into account its dimension), Sweden, Denmark and Italy (little). And for whom does the money go to, not wanting to irritate their financiers? It used to go to Ireland (that went from a “country of cohesion” to the second richest country of the EU in terms of per capita product – just after Luxembourg), it goes to Spain (the main beneficiary in absolute terms), to Greece (theold poorest member of the old poor members of the Union) and, of course, to Portugal (you guessed it: the current poorest member of the old poor countries of the Union; poorer than the two richest of the ten relatively poor countries in terms of the EU average that entered the club on the 1st May of 2004: Cyprus and Slovenia; and very soon poorer than two others: Malta and the Czech Republic).

Good Luck

Blair has an extraordinary task in hands: to quickly convince continentals to radically alter the allocation of money in the process of European integration, dedicating it to vanguard areas; and to convince, in the short-term, his fellow countrymen that this Europe of innovation, without CAP, with a large and deepened Single Market, that is more demanding in the application of structural funds, is worth it, it is fundamental for this process of European transformation that the United Kingdom (UK) adheres to the Single Currency. It is for this Herculean task of Blair that many in Europe look at expectation (starting with Durão Barroso, who has been going through complicated times since he assumed the Presidency of the European Commission – supported by, rember, the UK). If it comes through, Blair’s Europe will be a very different Europe. With a coordinated Defence sector but without aprioristic ambitions of counter-power against the USA. With the euro and a Single Market even more developed. With a big role for the Members-States (MS) and great caution towards advances considered as federalist (with that point, France will keep agreeing to). It will be a Europe that will reform its social-economic model that is so pressured by demography and global competition. And It will also be a more demanding Europe on what concerns security and, possibly, more attentive and selective in relation to immigration. It will be less cohesive and more competitive. With less funds of cohesion but with renewed opportunities for the most dynamic MS (and more risks for those who are incapable of reforming themselves and compete). If he achieves it, Blair will be making History. If he obtains an agreement in the Financial Perspectives, reforming the CAP and the English rebate and if, afterwards, he brings the UK closer to the European Union and to the Euro, Blair will be justly referenced in future historical pages relative to the beginnings of the XXI century of the “Old Continent”. Good Luck.

NON

The French have said “no” to the European Constitutional Treaty (CT). And, at the same time, it seems they have said “no” to everything except to the CT’s text.
They said “no” to the French government and to Chirac (“Non à la Constitution, au government, à Chirac”, was one of the slogans used by the defenders of “no”), to the growing unemployment, to the enlargements of the European Union (EU) that limit the French privileges and to market liberalization. But it does not seem like they have actually said “no” to the CT’s text. This is so because, in spite of the CT being more than a mere compilation of the previous Treatises (the form in which it is being presented by labour in the United Kingdom), it is not, most definetely, responsible by the amalgam of French refusals. The CT collects the Treaties, making them more legible (in spite of the text still being very extensive and detailed) and brings about some novelties relatively to Nice (the reigning Treaty), but not as much as it may seem (nothing compared to the Treaty of Maastricht, for example). And, above all, it does not seem to be to those novelties that the French said “no”. Have they said “no” to the inclusion in the CT of the Fundamental Rights Charter? Have they said “no” to the new counting of votes in the Council (less polemic than the one it pretends to substitute, that is, the one agreed to in Nice)? Have they said “no” to the little novelties in terms of the exclusive competences of the EU and to the greater use of qualified majority voting? Have they said “no” to the clarification of competences delimitation between EU and the Members-States (SM)?
Have they said “no” to the possibility of a structured permanent cooperation between some MS concerning a Common Security and Defence Policy? Have they said “no” to the definition of relationship mechanisms between the EU and the MS that wish to abandon it? Have they said “no” to the new office of a Foreign Minister of the EU? Or to the new office of President of the European Council? Have they said “no” to the end of the 3 pillar structure and to the assumption of the EU as an entity which has its own juridical personality? I do not think so.But, then, if the French did not say no to the CT’s novelties, what did they say no to? In my perspective, unfortunately, the French said “no” to what the CT symbolizes, that is, to the continuation, at least in the current settings, of the process of European integration. And it is here that a very serious problem arises. Everyone seems to say that the French “no” represents the need to change the integration process in Europe (without understanding, in very concrete terms, what it si that it actually means: more protectionism? More subsidies? More taxes? Less enlargements’? More influence of the “big”? But influence of the “big” when it comes to the economy, the military, demography? Or to the importance they systematically attribute to themselves?). And very few seem to say something that seems obvious to me: the European integration process is an open movement (on what concerns the participation of states), reformist and demanding. If the French legally refuse it, it does not mean the European refuse it. If the French (understandably but unfortunately) refuse a European integration process that has always benefit them (look at the Common Agricultural Policy and the Single Currency, for example) but tends to benefit them less in the future, that does not means that the Europeans do not want it. The problem of the French “no” is french and european. But it remains more French than European. Europe does not have to change to satisfy the French. Europe has to evolve to correspond to the expectations of europeans. And if the Europeans are interested in trailing routes that the French do not accept, then the EU will have to confront the French with their options. If it does not do that, it will always be under threat of French veto and judgement.
Europe is not France. And this is the fundamental moment to make it clear. Mesdames et Messieurs, les portes sont toujours ouvertes.